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I. INTRODUCTION
"The right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has
a public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona,
guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing which
parts of our lives shall become public and which parts we shall
hold close. ')
Minnesota recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy
for the first time in the landmark case, Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
in July 31998. The convergence of this newly recognized right to
privacy in Minnesota, with the recent and seemingly limitless ex-
pansion of Internet technology, raises many intriguing legal issues.
One issue involves the recent use of a technology referred to as
"cookies," which are text files that are placed by web sites onto
Internet users' hard drives when a computer visits that web site,
thus enabling the Internet company behind the web site to gather
information about that user's activities, preferences, and interests.
Impressive as this technology may seem, however, it may enable
Internet companies to intrude just a little too far into the personal
affairs of the unwitting computer users it monitors. Indeed, the le-
gality of the cookie technology under the common law right of pri-
vacy is currently at issue in a landmark lawsuit against the Internet
advertising company, DoubleClick.
The use of cookies in the United States is staggering. Double-
Click has issued more than forty million of them in just over a year• 4
of operation. A recent study that included a survey of ninety-one
of the 100 busiest web sites, and a random sample of 335 web sites,
found that web sites collect a vast amount of personal information
about consumers. The study found that 99% of the busiest web
sites and 97% of the random sample web sites collected some type
of personal identifying information.
This article will analyze the three new causes of action now
1. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
2. Id.
3. The distinguished privacy advocate, Arthur R. Miller, has described pri-
vacy law in the United States as being a "thing of threads and patches." ARTHUR R.
MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971).
4. CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE, Apr. 15, 1997.
5. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, Privacy Online: Fair Information Prac-
tices in the Electronic Marketplace: Hearing before the Senate Commission on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation (May 2000) (Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the
FCC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/200O/05/testimonyprivacy.htm.
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recognized in Minnesota under the invasion of privacy tort. It will
also address the issues being decided in the DoubleClick litigation
and describe the legislation currently in the works to address pri-
vacy concerns over cookies and similar Internet technology that
renders our apparent anonymous and private activity on the Inter-
net readily available to interested parties. Finally, this article will
opine on whether Internet cookies and other computer monitoring
devices could give rise to a similar claim for invasion of privacy un-
6der this evolving cause of action in Minnesota.
II. LAKE V. WAL-MART. RECOGNIZING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN
MINNESOTA
In 1998, Minnesota became the forty-eighth state to recognize
a common law right to privacy.7 In Lake v. Wal-Mart,8 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court adopted, under the umbrella of an invasion of
privacy claim, three separate causes of action: intrusion upon seclu-
sion; appropriation; and publication of private facts.9 The plaintiffs
in Lake had brought several rolls of film from their vacation to Wal-
Mart for development.' ° The film contained some nude pictures of
the plaintiffs, which Wal-Mart refused to return because of "their
nature."" Some Wal-Mart employees, however, showed the pictures
to their friends and, eventually, the pictures circulated throughout
the community." Based on these facts, the court for the first time
recognized the tort of invasion of privacy, defining the causes of ac-
tion according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Although
recognizing the three privacy actions mentioned above, the court
declined to adopt the cause of action for false light publicity, an-
other traditional privacy tort. The claims recognized in Lake can be
6. This article will not address statutory causes of action based on the cookie
technology discussed herein, such as a possible cause of action under the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); or any other cause of action beyond the
common law action for invasion of privacy in Minnesota.
7. Neither Wyoming nor North Dakota has recognized a common law or
statutory right to privacy. Every other jurisdiction recognizes some form of the
right to privacy. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 234.
8. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
9. Id. at 235.
10. Id. at 232-33.
11. Id. at 233.
12. Id. at 232-33.
13. Id. at 233.
2001]
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applied retroactively.W Citing only the definitions found in the Re-
statement, the supreme court in Lake "conferred upon other courts
the task of defining the contours of these newly recognized causes
of action.'
15
A. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
A cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion requires that a
person "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ...
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. " 16
This tort thus involves three key elements: (1) an intrusion (2) that
is highly offensive to a reasonable person (3) into a matter in which
the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy.17 An intrusion
occurs when the actor "believes, or is substantially certain, that he
lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the in-
trusive act."18
Following Lake, a line of cases alleging intrusion upon seclu-
sion have begun to develop in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Minnesota in the context of repossession, although none
have been successful so far.19 In Saice v. MidAmercia Bank, the plain-
tiffs had left their car running and unattended in their apartment
20complex parking lot with their two-month old daughter inside.
According to the plaintiffs, they were loading furniture into an at-
tached U-haul and were only out of sight of the car for a couple of
minutes. When the Minnesota Recovery Bureau repossession agent
came to repossess the car, however, he found it running and unat-
14. Applying the three-part test articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971), the Minnesota Court
of Appeals concluded that "the privacy rights recognized by the supreme court in
Lake must be available to any litigant, regardless of whether the conduct occurred
before Lake was decided." Summers v. R & D Agency, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 241,245-
47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
15. C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Minn.
1999).
16. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B (1977)).
17. Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871,975 (8th
Cir. 2000).
18. Id. (quoting O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir.
1989) and applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B (1977)).
19. E.g., Saice v. MidAmerica Bank, No. 98-2396, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20845, at *19 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 1999); Revering v. Norwest Bank Minn., No. 99-
480, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20726, at *8-9 (D. Minn., Nov. 30, 1999).
20. Saice, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20845, at *2-3.
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tended, so he got in and drove off.2' The plaintiffs called 911 when
they found their car and daughter missing, and when the police re-
ceived the call, they informed the plaintiffs that the car had been
22repossessed. The police contacted the repossession agent and re-
trieved the child, and returned her to her parents about forty-five
minutes after the agent had driven away in the car.23 The plaintiffs
subsequently sued the repossession bureau and MidAmercia bank
for, among other claims, intrusion upon seclusion.
Rejecting this claim, the court reasoned, "[p]laintiffs cannot
persuasively argue that their privacy was invaded when they volun-
tarily thrust their affairs into the public realm. ", 5 Plaintiffs had en-
tered the public realm, the court found, by using their car as col-
lateral for a loan, and by leaving the car running, unlocked and
26unattended in a parking lot easily accessible to the public. Con-
cluding that the thing intruded or pried into-the car-was not un-
der these circumstances "private," the court granted summary
judgment on the plaintiffs' privacy claim.
A few months later, the district court again had the opportu-
nity to examine an intrusion upon seclusion privacy claim in the
context of the repossession of an automobile. In Revering v. Nor-
west Bank Minnesota, the repossession agent came to the plaintiffs'
home to repossess their car following the plaintiffs' default on loan
payments.2 The plaintiffs invited the agent into their home, and
he stood inside the doorway for approximately forty-five minutes
while the plaintiffs removed their personal possessions from the
car.30 The repossession agent then drove the car out of the garage
and waited on the street, in his own car, for a tow truck to arrive.
The plaintiffs sued for intrusion upon seclusion based on the con-
32duct of the repossession agent in entering their home.
21. Id. at *3.
22. Id. at *3-4.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at'*17-18.
25. Id. at'*18-19.
26. Id. at*18.
27. Id. (citing Gosche v. Calvert High School, 997 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D. Ohio
1998)).
28. Revering v. Norwest Bank Minn., Civ. No. 99-480, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20726 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1999).
29. Id. at *34.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *7.
20011 1613
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The court rejected this claim on the grounds that the conduct
would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 33 Signifi-
candy, the court found the plaintiffs never objected to the repos-
session agent's presence in their home and, to the contrary, invited
him inside while they reviewed the paperwork and removed their• • 4
personal belongings from the vehicle. Absent evidence that the
plaintiffs themselves found the repossession agent's presence in
their home highly offensive, a reasonable person most likely would
not find the presence highly offensive either.35
In addition to cases decided after the adoption of the privacy
action in Lake, it is also instructive in assessing the scope of this new
tort to look at some of the decisions by Minnesota courts prior to
the Lake decision. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has long been
struggling with asserted claims for invasion of privacy for which no
cause of action existed in this state. One such case in which the
court of appeals opined on the scope of the intrusion upon seclu-
sion claim is Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting Co., in 1995.36 There,
the appellants claimed invasion of privacy based on an incident
where a veterinarian obtained the plaintiffs' permission to bring a
student to their house to observe the treatment of their cat.37 The
student had not informed either the veterinarian or the plaintiffs
that, in addition to attending college part-time, she was also em-
ployed by a local news station and had come in order to videotape
38the veterinarian's practice methods.
Although dismissing the plaintiffs' claims because Minnesota
courts did not recognize invasion of privacy torts, the court opined
that the plaintiffs had likely met the elements for a claim of intru-
sion upon seclusion. 39
B. Appropriation
The second cause of action recognized by the Lake court is ap-
propriation. Appropriation occurs where a person "appropriates to
his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another., 40 This type
33. Id. at *8.
34. Id. at *4, 8.
35. Id. at *8.
36. Copeland v. Hubbard Broad. Co., 526 N.W.2d 402, 405-06 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995).
37. Id. at 404.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 406.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652C (1977).
1614 [Vol. 27:3
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of privacy claim "is intended to protect the value of an individual's
notoriety or skill .... [T]he appropriation tort does not protect
one's name per se; rather, it protects the value associated with that
name."41 This type of privacy action is most frequently asserted in
the commercial context, for example, when a company uses a ce-
lebrity's name without his or her consent to endorse a product.
Interestingly, although Minnesota state courts had uniformly
rejected this cause of action before Lake, federal courts interpreting
Minnesota law had already speculated that the Minnesota Supreme
Court would adopt a similar cause of action, publicity rights. In
42Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., Minnesota's governor, when he was
still affiliated with wrestling, sued Titan Sports, Inc., the operating
company of the World Wrestling Federation, for royalties flowing
from the use of Ventura's likeness on wrestling videotapes.43 One
cause of action Ventura asserted was misappropriation of publicity
rights. 44 The Eighth Circuit determined that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court would recognize this tort even though it had refused
to recognize an appropriation cause of action under the theory of
invasion of privacy, reasoning that the policies underlying the right
of publicity differ from those underlying the right to privacy.4 Be-
cause the right to publicity involves pecuniary interests rather than
the emotional distress at issue in an appropriation action under an
invasion of privacy theory, the court found the tort of violation of
publicity rights more akin to trade name protection, which Minne-
46sota has long recognized.
With the Lake decision, however, Minnesota apparently chose
to protect not only the pecuniary interests at issue in a case such as
Ventura, but also the personal and emotional interests attendant to
an invasion of privacy claim. The United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota also has had the opportunity to address
the scope of this newly recognized claim following Lake.47 In Kova
tovich v. K-Mart, the defendant pharmacy had sent to a number of
customers promotional letters bearing the plaintiffs name as the
41. Kovatovich v. K-Mart Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (D. Minn. 1999) (cit-
ing Matthews v. Wozencroft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)).
42. 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 728.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 731.
46. Id.
47. Kovatovich v. K-Mart Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (D. Minn. 1999).
2001] 1615
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author-after the plaintiff had been discharged. 48 The plaintiff
claimed that by sending these letters the defendant appropriated
her name and good will for the purpose of soliciting business and
increasing sales.
The focus of the court's analysis in Kovatovich was on the re-
quirement of intent to state a claim. In concluding that intent
must be present to sustain an action for appropriation, the court
reasoned: "[t]o tortiously appropriate an individual's name, one
must appropriate for the purpose of taking advantage of that indi-
vidual's name, or reputation. It would seem axiomatic that an indi-
vidual could not commit an act for a purpose, without implicitly
demonstrating an intent to accomplish that purpose."0 Accord-
ingly, the court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim,
finding a fact issue on whether the defendant Possessed the requi-
site intent to appropriate the plaintiffs name. The court empha-
sized that the incidental use of a plaintiffs name or likeness would
not sustain an action for appropriation.52
C. Publication Of Private Facts
The third privacy claim recognized by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Lake is publication of private facts, which occurs when a
person "gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another ... if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate
concern to the public."53 The essential elements that a plaintiff
must show, then, are: (1) publicity; (2) of a private matter, or some-
thing that is not of legitimate concern to the public; and (3) which
publicity is highly offensive.
In the only published Minnesota case addressing a publication
of private facts claim after Lake, C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart, the District
Court for the District of Minnesota focused on the issue of "public-
ity." 54 Turning for guidance to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the court stated:
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 986-87.
51. Id. at 985-88.
52. Id. at 987-88.
53. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652D (1977)).
54. C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS
§ 652D, cmt. a (1977)).
1616 [Vol. 27:3
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"Publicity," as it is used in this Section, differs from "pub-
lication," as that term is used ... in connection with liabil-
ity for defamation. "Publication," in that sense, is a word
of art, which includes any communication by the defen-
dant to a third person. "Publicity," on the other hand,
means that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the
matter must be regarded as substantially certain to be-
come one of public knowledge .... Thus it is not an inva-
sion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this
Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff s
private life to a single person or even to a small group of
55
persons.
In C.L.D., the plaintiff, an employee of Wal-Mart, requested a
56medical leave of absence from her employer. In a meeting with
her supervisor, the plaintiff volunteered the information that she
was pregnant and was "losing the baby."57 The plaintiff claimed
that when she returned from her medical leave, other Wal-Mart
58employees knew that she had been pregnant and had an abortion.
She sued under the theory of publication of private facts, claiming
that her supervisor disclosed private and personal information to
her co-workers.59
The district court dismissed the privacy claim on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to show that the matter was disseminated to
a sufficiently large number of people to constitute publicity.
Adopting the Restatement's definition, the court held that the re-
quirement of publicity could be met only by disclosure to a signifi-
cantly large number of people, in the media, or in other forms that
would make the information accessible to the public at large. 61 The
C.L.D. court reasoned that the Minnesota Supreme Court, al-
though offering no guidance in Lake, would most likely also follow
the Restatement and refuse to allow a claim for publication of pri-
62vate facts to lay based on disclosure to only a few individuals.
The court also relied on a 1975 decision by the supreme court
55. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D, cmt. a (1977)).
56. Id. at 1082.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1086.
61. Id. at 1084-85.
62. Id. at 1085.
20011 1617
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in Hendry v. Conner,63 which provides additional guidance as to how
this tort will be construed in the future. In Hendiy, the plaintiff
claimed that a hospital had invaded her right to privacy by stating
in a loud voice in the presence of several people in the waiting
room that her child would not be admitted until the plaintiff paid
her outstanding bill. The hospital staff also commented on the
plaintiff's petition for bankruptcy. 64 The court did not even reach
the issue of whether it should recognize a right to privacy, as it
found that the plaintiff would not have stated a claim in any event
because the disclosure of the information to a small group does not
constitute publicity."'
The Minnesota Court of Appeals seemed less rigid in its specu-
lation on the parameters of this cause of action in the later deci-
66sion, Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center. Stubbs involved a
claim for publication of private facts based on a hospital's unau-
thorized publication of "before" and "after" photographs of the
67plaintiff's face to promote the hospital's cosmetic surgery center.
Although acknowledging that it is not the function of the court of
appeals to adopt new causes of action,68 the court indicated its de-
sire to provide a remedy for the claim before it: "[w] here as here,
unwanted publicity is given to an aspect of an individual's life
which is inherently private, justice would seem to require that there
be some form of redress under the law. It is especially distressing
that the published information was disclosed by a physician.,
69
D. False Light Publicity
The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to recognize in Lake
the fourth traditional privacy cause of action, false light publicity.7"
False light publicity is defined by the Restatement as when a per-
son:
... gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light ... if (a)
the false light in which the other was placed would be
63. 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1975).
64. Id. at 922.
65. Id.
66. 448 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
67. Id. at 79-80.
68. Id. at 81.
69. Id. at 80-81.
70. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236.
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highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor
had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.71
The court rejected a claim for false light publicity, finding it
too similar to a claim for defamation. The court reasoned that
not only was a false light cause of action unnecessary due to the
protections of defamation, but because a false light claim is more
71
expansive than a defamation claim, it would create too much ten-
sion between the tort of false light publicity and the First Amend-
ment.74 The court did not wish to risk stifling free speech any fur-
ther to protect a small category of 7Publications not already covered
by the defamation cause of action.
In refusing to recognize false light publicity as a cause of ac-
tion while adopting the other three privacy torts, Minnesota fol-
lowed in the footsteps of several other jurisdictions, including
Texas, which declined to recognize false light publicity for the
same reasons in 1994.6
III. INTERNET COOKIES: WHERE IS YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION
GOING?
Many people are unfamiliar with the practices used by Internet
companies to track where individual users travel on the World
Wide Web. It is not just a coincidence that when users log on to
the Internet they are greeted with advertisements and news head-
lines in their fields of interest.77 Internet companies track which
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652E (1977).
72. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235.
73. Id. See also Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789,
793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235, for the proposition
that defamation is more expansive than false light publicity).
74. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the ight of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236.
76. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1994). See also Lake,
582 N.W.2d at 235 (citing cases from Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas).
77. Internet Cookies: Are You Gambling With Your Privacy ?, COMPUTER SOURCE
MAG. 1, 1 (Nov. 1998), available at http://www.source magazine.com/archive/
1198/feat 11981.asp.
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computer travels to what sites so that they can better target their
advertisements by using cookies.7s
Cookies 79 are small text files that can be placed on computer
hard drives when the computer visits a particular web site. ° Cook-
ies can be used to transmit information back to the web site about
the users' activities and preferences, or to inform the web site
about purchases located in a shopping cart on the site."' Generally,
the only web site that can read a cookie is the one that placed it on
the hard drive. 2
Netscape Communications, a pioneer in cookie technology,
has made three clear statements about cookies: "(1) [c]ookies
cannot read information from a consumer's hard drive; (2) they
cannot gather sensitive information or in any way give the web site
any information not specifically provided by the consumer; and (3)
[c]ookies cannot be read or in any way used by any other web
site.""
There are a number of benefits to Internet users when cookies
814are used. The use of cookies on the Internet allows consumers to
spend less time searching for desired information and specific con-85
tent. Cookies could alleviate the need for databases of personal
information altogether, as everything about a user's preferences
can be found on his or her hard drive. For example, when visiting
web sites that sell books or CDs, the site automatically would know
what types of books and music the user prefers simply because of
the information cookies provide. There would no longer be a need
to keep a database with personally identifying information such as
78. Id.
79. Most of the available literature discusses the use of cookies. However,
personal information is collected in other ways as well. A new vehicle known as a
"web bug" or "1-pixel GIF" is also being used. Web bugs are electronic tags that
help web sites and advertisers track visitors' whereabouts on the Internet but are
invisible on the page and are much smaller than a cookie. Stefanie Olsen, Tiny
New Bugs Threaten Privacy: More Insidious Internet Version of Cookies, CANBERRA TIMES,
July 17, 2000, at Al3.
80. Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Policy, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/pri-
vacy.htm (last modified Aug. 22, 2000).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. DENNIS C. HAYES, COOKIES AND THE INTERNET, U.S. INTERNET INDUSTRY
ASS'N (1999), at http://www.usiia.org/pubs/cookies.html.
84. Internet Cookies: Are You Gambling Your Privacy , supra note 77, at 1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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phone numbers, addresses, and e-mails.8'
Some consider cookies useful and beneficial.88 While cookies
attempt to promote efficiency and easy use of the Web, however,
they have become the center of an Internet privacy and consumer
rights controversy."" While some have expressed concern over the
use of cookies to track on-line habits, web site marketers have main-
tained they do not collect personally identifiable information be-
cause they cannot identify individual users.90
IV. JUDNICK V. DOUBLECLICK: COOKIES GIVE CAUSE FOR INVASION OF
PRIVACY ACTION
On January 26, 2000, Harriet M. Judnick, on behalf of the
general public of the State of California, filed a lawsuit against
DoubleClick, Inc. ("DoubleClick") in the Superior Court of Cali-
fornia, Main County. 9' DoubleClick is the largest provider of
Internet advertising products and services for online advertisers
and web site publishers throughout the world.
The complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief enjoining the
defendants from using technology to personally identify Internet
users, specifically mentioning cookies. The relief sought also in-
cludes a mechanism for users to destroy personally identifying in-
formation that has been gathered, destruction of all records of per-
sonally identifying information, enjoinment from the use of e-mail
addresses obtained for commercial e-mail advertising, corrective
advertising, costs, and attorney's fees.93 The basis for the relief
sought was the allegation that DoubleClick used unlawful, mislead-
ing, and deceptive business practices that violated the privacy rights
of the plaintiffs.94
87. Id.
88. HAYEs, supra note 83, at 1.
89. Id.
90. Michael Geist, Cookies Crumble Personal Privacy, CYBERLAW 1, 2 (Feb. 10,
2000), at http://www.globetechnology.com/archive/gam /Ebusiness/20000210/
TWGEIST.html.
91. Compl. for Injunctive Relief, Judnick v. DoubleClick, No. CV 000421 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. filedJan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 'Judnick Complaint"].
92. Paragraph 1 (a) of the Prayer for Relief seeks a permanent injunction
"Enjoining Defendants ... from using any technology for the purpose of personally
identifying Internet users or Web Site visitors, including 'cookies,' on the Internet,
without obtaining the prior express written consent of the Internet user." Id. at
10.
93. Id.atO-11.
94. In paragraph one of the Preliminary Allegations, the Judnick Complaint
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The DoubleClick action has received nationwide publicity.95 In
February, 2000, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") notified
DoubleClick that it would perform a routine inquiry into the pri-
vacy policies of the company. 96 In addition, all of the attention on
Internet privacy prompted the Electronic Privacy Information Cen-
ter ("EPIC") to file a complaint against DoubleClick with the FTC
on February 10, 2000.9' The complaint by EPIC made similar alle-
gations and sought similar relief against DoubleClick. 9 8 Double-
Click also has been the target of actions by the states of New York
and Michigan.99 Michigan has taken the position against Double-
Click that only the primary web site a user visits can place a cookie
without obtaining permission from the user, and that secondary
sites with which the user has no actual contact must get affirmative
permission before placing cookies on users' hard drives. 00
As if the attention from the FTC, private citizens, and states
wasn't enough news about DoubleClick and the use of cookies,
February 2000 also saw the introduction of a bill by New Jersey
Senator Robert Torricelli which would restrict advertisers from
pooling consumer information, and seeks the establishment of two
new privacy caucuses.10'
states:
Defendants use sophisticated computer technology to identify Internet
users, track and record their Internet use and the Internet web sites they
visit, and obtain a plethora of highly confidential and personal informa-
tion about them without their consent, including, without limitation,
their names, addresses, ages, shopping patterns and histories, credit card
information, bank account information, sexual orientation and prefer-
ences, and other private information. Defendants mislead and have mis-
led the General Public into a false sense of security regarding their Inter-
net use, while deceptively acquiring, storing, and selling millions of
Internet users' most private and personal information for profit.
Id. at 1-2.
95. E.g., Rob Conlin, DoubleClick Sued for Online Privacy Invasion, -COMMERCE
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2000) at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/?id= 2362;
The Class Act, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES AND COMMERCIAL LAW ATTOR-
NEYS, May 19, 2000, at 6-7.
96. Mike Godwin, Privacy Group Files FTC Complaint Against DoubleClick Over
'Cookies, 'E-COMMERCE L. WKLY., Feb. 24, 2000, at 1, 1, available at http://www.law
ewsnet.com/ stories/A16852-2000Feb23.html.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Chet Dembeck, Online Privacy Inside and Out, F-COMMERCE TIMES, 1, 2
(Apr. 25, 2000), at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/000425-
la.shtml.
100. Id.
101. Godwin, supra note 96, at 5.
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A. What Did Doubleclick Do To Deserve A Lawsuit?
The Judnick v. DoubleClick, Inc. Complaint describes how (upon
information and belief of the plaintiffs) DoubleClick does business
in a way that constitutes an invasion of privacy.0 2 The Complaint
alleges that DoubleClick is the largest Internet advertiser on the
World Wide Web, and that it uses cookies to create and assign iden-
tification numbers to Internet users.1° These identification num-
bers allow DoubleClick to track user's visits to web sites that were
maintained by DoubleClick's clients.
0 4
The Complaint also claims that DoubleClick acquired a direct-
marketing services company that could maintain a database of per-
sonal information gathered from customers.'0 5 DoubleClick did
acquire Abacus Direct Corp. for $1.7 billion, an acquisition ob-S106
jected to by Internet privacy advocates. The allegation is that the
direct-marketing service owned by DoubleClick contains identifying
information for ninety percent (90%) of the households in Amer-
ica.10 7 The Complaint further alleges that prior to the acquisition
of the direct-marketing company, DoubleClick made public state-
ments that it did not collect personally identifying information, and
that the plaintiffs had and continue to have an expectation of pri-
vacy in their Internet usage.'08
The plaintiffs in this action are especially concerned with the
collection of personally identifying information that is "sensitive" in
nature. 00 The web sites described in the Complaint as "sensitive"
include those regarding sexual orientation and sexually oriented
products and services, as well as: "law related sites, political sites,
book sites, videotape/DVD sites, and online banking and broker-
age sites."' 10
The suit against DoubleClick has prompted many other law-
suits. All complaints, including those against Amazon.com, Inc.,
RealNetworks, Inc., and Buy.com, Inc., have been consolidated as
102. Judnick Complaint, supra note 91, at 1-2, 1.
103. Id. at 4,119 &13.
104. Id. at 4, 13.
105. Id. at4, 14.
106. Conlin, supra note 95, at 2. Privacy advocates felt that the acquisition of
Abacus Direct Corp. by DoubleClick would lead to the exploitation of Internet us-
ers. Id.
107. Judnick Complaint, supra note 91, at 4-5, 1 14.
108. Id. at 6, 19.
109. Id. at 5, 17.
110. Id.
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In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation in the Southern District of
New York. A Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint was
filed on May 26, 2000. The ?arties have completed briefing Dou-
bleClick's motion to dismiss; a decision is likely sometime by the
end of 2000 or early 2001.
B. DoubleClick's Privacy Policies
Prior to acquiring Abacus Direct Corp., DoubleClick did not
use the information gathered from its placement of cookies to per-
sonally identify Internet users. Instead, DoubleClick would create a
profile on the users' visits and habits from the information the
cookies gathered, and then sell that information to any bidder un-
der the DoubleClick umbrella. In June of 1999, however, Dou-
bleClick announced the merger with Abacus, and announced that
it would be revising its privacy policy."3 Upon completion of the
merger between the companies in November, 1999, DoubleClick
had at its fingertips personally identifying information which could
then be matched to the information gathered by the direct-
marketing group and used to target individuals personally." Dou-
bleClick stated when the merger was completed that personally
identifiable information would be combined with the information
that was collected from web sites.' 5 This merging process, com-
monly known as profiling, allows DoubleClick to obtain the house-
hold or individual identity of the person visiting one of the more
than 11,000 web sites that use DoubleClick's cookies.
1 6
What created the most concern was whether DoubleClick
would have an opt-out procedure for Internet users who did not
wish to have their information recorded or used with other person-
ally identifiable information that the direct-marketing service might
have already collected about them. Because DoubleClick runs the
advertising on other sites, most Internet users who are being
tracked by DoubleClick never even log on to the DoubleClick site
(www.doubleclick.net) to be informed of the option they have to
111. The defendants moved to dismiss only the federal statutory claims. Id.
DoubleClick did not seek to have any of the state law claims dismissed, including
the invasion of privacy claim. Id.
112. Internet Cookies: Are You Gambling With Your Privacy , supra note 77, at 2.
113. Godwin, supra note 96, at 3.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id.
116. Will Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick With Double Cross, at http://
www.USATODAY.com (last visited May 17, 2000).
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refrain from participation.
Early in March, 2000, DoubleClick took the position that the
adoption of a new privacy policy allowing the merger of personally
identifiable information with anonymous Web activity was a mis-
take." 7 The chief executive at DoubleClick stated:
Let me be clear: DoubleClick has not implemented this
plan, and has never associated names, or any other per-
sonally identifiable information, with anonymous user ac-
tivity across web sites .... We commit today, that until
there is agreement between government and industry on
privacy standards, we will not link personally identifiable
information to anonymous user activity across web sites.'
8
V. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND PRIVACY REGULATIONS
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which is a division of
the Department of Commerce, created an Advisory Committee on
Online Access and Security in January of 2000.119 The committee120
consisted of forty representatives, as well as the FTC, and was
slated to spend five months analyzing the impact of security andS121
privacy on the Internet. The members of the committee were se-
lected from over 180 nominees. 22
A. The Federal Trade Commission Report
The FTC recently issued two reports that reveal its findings re-
garding online privacy and made recommendations to Congress.
123
The recommendations made to Congress in July of 2000 include a
117. Jerry LaMartina, DoubleClick Backtracks on Privacy Plan, MEDIA CENT. (Mar.
2, 2000), at http://www.mediacentral.com/channels/advertising/952039081_307
.html.
118. Id.
119. Mary Hillebrand, FTC Committee to Tackle Online Privacy Issues, E-CoMMERCE
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2000), available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/arti-
cles2000/000126-3.shtml.
120. The group of forty includes representatives from twenty-three various
Internet and hardware companies, eight consumer and business advocacy groups,
one lieutenant governor, and a few attorneys and scholars. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3.
123. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreprtjune2000.pdf;
FED. TRADE COMM'N, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, PART 2, REcOM-
MENDATIONS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/index. htm#27
[hereinafter "FTC RECOMMENDATIONS"].
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call for legislation to complement the efforts that the members of
the committee (the Network Advertising Industry ("NA")) were• • 124
going to be making in self-regulation. The FT7C and the NAI
have promulgated once again the four core principles that pre-
dated the online medium for fair information practices, this time
recommending that they be the cornerstone goals for any future
legislation. 2 5 The four principles are: notice, choice, access, and
security.116 The FTC would like to translate these principles into
legislation that would require disclosure of information practices
regarding personal information to consumers, give consumers op-
tions about how and when personal information can be collected
from them, and for what purpose it can be used, enable consumers
to access any information collected about them, and make reason-
able assurances that the information collected is accurate and not
able to be used without authorization.2 7
The report and recommendations have received criticism.1
8
Many privacy advocates believe that the FTC needs to take stronger
steps to ensure online privacy, and particularly disagree with the
way the NAI agreement forces consumers to affirmatively opt-out of
information collection instead of opting-in. 29 "Critics are especially
concerned about wording in the agreement that allows advertisers
to merge information such as names and addresses with online
browsing habits.",
3 0
Although DoubleClick, Inc. is a member of the NAI and has
agreed to abide by the principles set by that body and backed by
the FTC, only ninety percent of the industry corporations are
members, and therefore only ninety percent are bound by the
agreement.131  Furthermore, the agreement is only for self-
regulation, and has no force of law. 32 The NAI's agreement seeks
to enforce privacy protections which would allow consumers to opt-
out of anonymous information collection, opt-out of personally
124. FTC REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 123, at 6.
125. Id. "[T]hese fair information practice principles predate the online me-
dium; indeed, agencies in the United States, Canada, and Europe have recognized
them in government reports, guidelines, and model codes since 1973." Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. D. Ian Hopper, FTC Backs Online Industry's Privacy Plan, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PREss, July 28, 2000, at 1C.
129. Id. at 3C.
130. Id.
131. FTC REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 123, at 10.
132. Id.; see also Hopper, supra note 128, at 1C.
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identifiable information collection, and give consumers a chance to
determine if they want anonymous information merged with per-
sonally identifiable information to create a profile.
133
B. Pending Legislation
A plethora of legislation is pending in Congress. Two pieces of
legislation have received a significant amount of attention: Senator
Torricelli's Secure Online Communication Enforcement Act of
2000, and Senator Hollings' Consumer Privacy Protection Act.
Senator Torricelli, from New Jersey, introduced the Secure
Online Communication Enforcement Act of 2000 on February 10,
2000.134 This legislation, which proposes to amend Title 18 of the
U.S. Code "to provide for the applicability to operators of Internet
web sites of restrictions on the disclosure or records and other in-
formation relating to the use of such sites, and for other purposes,"
was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary."'
Rep. Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. introduced an identical amendment in the
House of Representatives on March 1, 2000.136 The legislation
pending in the House of Representatives was referred to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on March 1, and then referred to the Sub-
committee on Crime on March 27.137 There has been no further
action taken in either the House of Representatives or the Sen-
ate.1
38
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act introduced by Senator
Ernest Hollings of South Carolina on May 23, 2000, is much more
comprehensive. 13 9 The bill has the intent to protect the privacy of
American consumers, and is broken down into nine separate ti-
des. 140 These titles include Online Privacy; Privacy Protections for
Consumers of Books, Recorded Music, and Videos; Enforcement
and Remedies; Communications Technology Privacy Protections;
Rulemaking and Studies; Protection of Personally Identifiable In-
133. Hopper, supra note 128, at 3C.
134. Secure Online Communication Enforcement Act of 2000, S. 2063, 106th
Cong. (2000).
135. Id.
136. Secure Online Communication Enforcement Act of 2000, H.R. 3770,
106th Cong. (2000).
137. Id.
138. This is based on information posted on the Thomas federal legislative
Web site, at http://thomas.loc.gov. (n.d.).
139. Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000).
140. Id.
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formation in Bankruptcy; Internet Security Initiatives; Congres-
sional Information Security Standards; as well as Definitions.
141
The Hollings' bill provides stringent guidelines about person-
ally identifiable information and its collection and use by Internet
and online service providers or web site operators. The bill pro-
vides that users whose information will be collected must be pro-
vided notice that would inform them of the information that would
be collected, how it is to be collected, and the disclosure practices
of the provider or operator.143 Furthermore, the bill requires that
the sites receive affirmative consent in advance to collect or disclose
information, and that denial of consent is effective until the user
changes it regardless of whether the sites are modified or change
their policies. 4 The bill also requires that the FTC make rules to
implement the provisions. The Act would not be effective until
those rules were completed.
145
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act has seen no develop-
ments since it was introduced on May 23, 2000, except to be re-
ferred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion on that date. 146 Whether either of these pieces of legislation
are passed into law remains to be seen. Without question, the Con-
sumer Privacy Protection Act will be much more difficult to pass
because of its comprehensiveness, and Internet companies are sure
to protest the stringent requirements it places on them. Further-
more, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act conflicts with the FTC
report to Congress in the way it implements opt-outs by users-
which is a highly contested issue between privacy advocates and the
Internet companies.
C. Alternatives To Legislation
The World Wide Web Consortium (WC3) is developing an al-
ternative to legislation called the Platform for Privacy Prefer-
ences. "47 Under this plan, Web servers would communicate their
privacy policies and only go to sites that meet their specifications,
141. Id.
142. Id. § 101-02.
143. Id. § 102.
144. Id. §§ 102, 105.
145. Id. §§ 107-08.
146. This is based on information posted on the Thomas federal legislative
Web site, at http://thomas.loc.gov. (n.d.).
147. Brenda Sandburg, Privacy Patrol, THE RECORDER, June 27, 2000, at 1, 3.
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so that users can determine what they feel comfortable with and1. • 148
choose which provider to use accordingly. While most compa-
nies believe that technology alternatives are preferable to legisla-
tion, EPIC and other privacy advocates believe that the proposed
plan does not go far enough.4 9
Litigation regarding the privacy policies of Internet companies
is also an alternative to legislation, as is demonstrated by In re Dou-
bleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation.5 0 Some plaintiffs' attorneys believe
that litigation is preferable because the rules are changing so fast in
t -- . - 151
the industry.
Action by state and federal agencies is also a possibility. In
June, 1999, the Minnesota Attorney General brought an action
against US Bank and US Bancorp alleging that the companies had
illegally violated the privacy policy posted on their web sites.' The
Minnesota Attorney General alleged that US Bank had sold confi-
dential information about its customers to a telemarketing com-
pany that sold memberships in a dental and health service. Specifi-
cally, it was alleged that US Bank provided the telemarketing
company with seventeen items of personal information, including
social security numbers, account status and frequency of use, a be-
havior score, a bankruptcy score, gender and marital status.13
Shortly after the complaint was filed, US Bank announced that it
was terminating the contract with the telemarketing company and a
148. Id.
149. EPIC and other privacy advocates had released a report critical of the
plan proposed by W3C, and have maintained that privacy issues exist because of
the lack of legislation. Id.
150. See generally DoubleClick Inc., SEC 10-Q filing (Aug. 11, 2000), available at
http://biz.yahoo.com/e/000512/dclk.html. In addition to the DoubleClick suit, in
early August, 2000, a class action complaint was filed against Toys R Us for, among
other things, invasion of privacy. Benbow v. Coremetrics, Inc., No., A OOCA 469 SS
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2000). The Benbow complaint alleges Toys R Us had promised
as part of its online privacy policy that it would keep all personal information
"completely confidential." The complaint alleges that Toys R Us violated its pri-
vacy policy by sharing the personal and private information to Coremetrics, Inc.
See Complaint, Benbow v. Coremetrics, Inc., No., A 00CA 469 SS (W.D. Tex. Aug.
2, 2000), 38, 39.
151. Sandberg, supra note 147, at 1.
152. For a more detailed discussion of the US Bank lawsuit, see Mark E. Bud-
nitz, Consumer Privacy in Electronic Commerce: As the Millenium Approached, Minnesota
Attacked, Regulators Refrained, and Congress Compromised, 14 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y. 821, 828-49 (2000). See also Dee DePass, U.S. Bank Wrapping Up Pri-
vacy Suit, MINNEAPOLIS STARTRIB., Sept. 2, 2000, at ID.
153. Budnitz, supra note 152, at 829.
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settlement was reached with the Attorney General.
54
In July, 2000, the FTC sued Toysmart.com to stop the bank-
rupt toy e-tailer from selling names and other personal information
about its customers. 155 Although Toysmart.com had pledged never
to share data collected by its online customers, it was allegedly
planning to sell that information as part of a bankruptcy sale." 6
The FTC settled its charges against Toysmart.com in late July,
2000.157
VI. COOKIES IN MINNESOTA: CAN THE CAUSE OF ACTION BE
SUSTAINED?
In light of the new and still evolving tort of invasion of privacy
in Minnesota, it is interesting to speculate as to whether litigation
similar to the DoubleClick case could be sustained here. It is impor-
tant to note at the outset of this analysis the egregiousness of the
facts under which Minnesota chose to recognize individual privacy
rights. While other cases presented themselves as earlier opportu-
nities for the court to recognize a claim for invasion of privacy, the
court did not do so until addressing the unauthorized publication
of nude photographs to a large number of people.158 Indeed, the
court prefaced its holding by stating: "[o]ne's naked body is a very
private part of one's person and generally known to others only by
choice. This is a type of privacy interest worthy of protection.,159
As discussed above, however, certain aspects of the cookie
technology, applied to the right factual scenario, might appear
equally egregious to a court. First, anonymous information col-
lected by cookies can be matched with personally identifying in-
formation, enabling Internet companies to put a name, address
and phone number together with an enormous amount of private
information ranging from finances, medical conditions, and sexual
preferences. This type of conduct seems just as egregious as the
disclosure of a nude photograph. Moreover, so-called secondary
sites who advertise on web pages can obtain this personal and pri-
154. Id. at 831, 843.
155. Carolyn Said, FTC Sues to Stop Toysmart.com from Selling Data, SAN FRAN.
CHRON.,July 11, 2000, at C1.
156. Id.
157. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC ANNOUNCES SETrLEMENT WITH BANKRUPT WEB-
SITE, TOYSMART.COM, REGARDING ALLEGED PRIVACY POLICYVIOLATIONS (2000) (press
release), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/20O0/07/toysmart2.htm.
158. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 235 n.1.
159. Id. at 235.
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vate information without a user even having an opportunity to "opt-
out" or prevent the disclosure of the information. This seems par-
ticularly unfair. The ability of a company to know, for example, that
John Smith accesses pornography sites every evening at 11:00, or
that Jane Brown receives treatment for mental illness, and then to
sell that information for financial gain, seems to cross the line.
Does this conduct, however repugnant it may be, provide a basis for
a privacy action in Minnesota?
A. Appropriation
As stated above, a claim for appropriation will lie when a party
uses the name or likeness of another for his own benefit. Appro-
priation is specifically intended to protect the value of a person's
name or the notoriety associated therewith,' 6° as where a person's
name is used without consent to sell a product. A Minnesota court
could conclude that the appropriation tort does not apply to the
conduct of a company obtaining per'sonal information through the
use of computer technology if that personal information did not
have some inherent value that the company sought to exploit.
On the other hand, because the name and personally identify-
ing information obtained through the use of cookies and other
similar technology is used for the financial benefit of the Internet
company collecting the information, this situation is somewhat
analogous to Kovatovich, where the mere use of the plaintiffs name
on a marketing letter formed the basis of the claim when the al-
leged purpose of the use of the name was financial gain.16' Even in
Kovatovich, however, the plaintiff alleged that it was the inherent
value and good will of her name-as she was well known and re-
spected among the group who received the letters-that was mis-
appropriated by the store. That is not the case where a person's
name is used for the purpose of targeting him to advertise specific
products. It is therefore unclear whether a court would apply an
appropriation cause of action to the use of personal information by
an Internet company, although depending on the egregiousness of
the facts, a Minnesota court might be inclined to allow an appro-
priation action to lie.
160. Kovatovich, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 986 (quoting Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15
F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)).
161. Id. at 987.
162. Id. at 985.
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B. Publication Of Private Facts
The use of cookies may also give rise to a claim for publication
of private facts. Again, this cause of action occurs where someone:
(1) makes public a matter concerning the private life of another;
(2) the publicity would be highly offensive to a reasonable person;
and (3) the matter is not of legitimate concern to the public. 63 Ac-
cording to the Restatement, a matter is private if it is not already a
matter of public record, such as a person's date of birth or marital
status, or if it is available for public inspection, such as income tax
returns.'6 Additionally, this tort would not impose liability for "giv-
ing further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the
public eye." 65 Thus, a cause of action would not lie, for example,
against a newspaper for publishing a photograph of a person in a
public place.I
Certainly then, using the Restatement as a guide, the web sites
a person visits and the information a person reads on the Internet
in the privacy of his own home would be considered private, or not
of legitimate concern to the public. In addition, the disclosure of
this private matter, at least in some circumstances, could be highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Although this showing might not
be met if the plaintiff himself had disclosed the same information
to others, if the information disclosed was otherwise readily observ-
able by the public, or if it was completely innocuous, it could be
met if "a reasonable person would feel justified feeling seriously.• 167
aggrieved" by the disclosure. For example, having your sexual
preferences or serious medical condition disclosed for profit with-
out your consent would easily seem to satisfy this requirement. The
final issue then, as in C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart, becomes whether the dis-
closure by one company to other companies is sufficient to consti-
tute publicity to the public at large. 168
As noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has already
opined in Hendry that communication to a small group of people in
a hospital waiting room would not constitute publicity. Later, in
C.L.D., the Minnesota federal district court, speculating that Min-
nesota courts would adopt a narrow definition of publicity-
163. Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
165. Id. at 386.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 387.
168. C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
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possibly even more narrow than the Restatement's definition-
rejected communication to a group of employees as publicity and
indicated that the disclosure must be made to the media "or in any
other form accessible to the population at large." 69 The disclosure
of information obtained by cookies and other tracking devices to
various Internet companies seems to fall somewhere between the
disclosure to a small group of people, as in Hendiy and C.L.D., and
the public-at-large. The Restatement suggests that publicity would
be satisfied by a statement to a thousand people, or by a sign posted
in a store window, but not by a statement made to a person's em-
ployer."' The key is that the communication must be made to so
many persons that "the matter must be substantially certain to be
become one of public knowledge." 7'
Although the disclosure of private information among compa-
nies may not appear as "public" as disclosure through the media,
the potentially unlimited sale of personal information to busi-
nesses, advertisers, collection agencies, marketers and financial in-
stitutions, is likely broad enough in scope as to satisfy this element.
Indeed, in the DoubleClick litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that Dou-
bleClick provided the information it gathered about users to more
than 11,000 web site clients.'72 In light of the potential reach of this
information, it seems likely that even under a narrow definition of
publicity, the courts would be inclined to find that this type of dis-
closure states a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
C. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The other cause of action likely to apply to computer monitor-
ing is intrusion upon seclusion, which is, again, an intentional in-
trusion upon the solitude or seclusion or another of his private af-
fairs that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Unlike the
publication of private facts cause of action, this tort does not re-
quire any publication or publicity, but only an offensive invasion
into one's private life. As for the intrusion itself, a court likely
would find that the actor "'believes, or is substantially certain, that
he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the
169. Id.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a, illus. 1-3 (1977).
171. C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
172. Consol. Amended Class Action Complaint, Healy v. Doubleclick Inc.,
Master File No. 00-CIV-0641 (NRB), 27 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 1, 2000).
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intrusive act ' ',1 3 when the tracking is done without the user's con-
sent or any opportunity for the user to protect the information.
As with a claim for publication of private facts, a person could
not state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion with respect to mat-
ters of public record or matters voluntarily disclosed to the public
by the plaintiff.14 In contrast to the repossession cases discussed
above, however, where the plaintiffs "voluntarily thrust their affairs
into the public realm" by using the car for collateral on a loan, a
person likely has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her
viewing of materials over the Internet in the privacy of his home.
Indeed, the Restatement cites as an example of this claim an "inves-
tigation or examination into [one's] private concerns, as by open-
ing his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet,
examining his private bank account.' ' 115 The secret tracking of a
person's activities on the Internet and the collection of this infor-
mation seems just as invasive if not more so as the opening of a per-
son's mail or wallet. Although Internet companies would argue
that a person waives her right to privacy by voluntarily accessing dif-
ferent web sites, absent an express release to that effect, the privacy
expectation appears strong.
A plaintiff does have to show that the intrusion or interference
in her private affairs is so substantial as to be highly offensive to the
ordinary person, unlike the publicity action where a plaintiff does
not have to show publication or use of the private information by
another. 17 6 Although the federal district court dismissed one of the
repossession cases, discussed supra, for failure to satisfy the highly
offensive element, there, the plaintiffs had invited the repossession
agent into their home; accordingly, they could not demonstrate
that his presence was highly offensive.' Perhaps more instructive
was the court of appeal's dicta in Copeland that the conduct of the
reporter in secretly filming the veterinarian's visit to the plaintiff's
home would have stated an action for intrusion upon seclusion if
the tort had been recognized in the state at that time./T Using
173. Fletcher, 220 F.3d at 876 (quoting O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d
1079, 1083 (3rd Cir. 1089)).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c. (1977).
175. Id. at cmt. b.
176. Id. at cmt. a.
177. Revering v. Norwest Bank Minn., No. 99-480, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20726, at *10 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 1999).
178. Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995).
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Copeland as a guide, the surreptitious placement of cookies on a
person's computer and the gathering and monitoring of private
and personal information would seem equally offensive to a rea-
sonable person.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Minnesota courts were reluctant to recognize a cause
of action for invasion of privacy, and analysis of the cases applying
the various privacy actions suggest that the courts will apply that
tort narrowly, it is likely (at least in the opinion of these authors)
that facts similar to the DoubleClick case could give rise to a privacy
action in Minnesota, most likely for intrusion upon seclusion and
publication of private facts. As demonstrated by the public reac-
tion to the sale of private information to telemarketing companies
by US Bancorp and the immediate settlement of that case, that type
of intrusion touches a nerve-and likely would receive protection
from the courts. Accordingly, unless legislation is passed or inter-
nal controls are implemented among technology companies, Min-
nesota courts can expect to see litigation over the merging of
cookie technology with private information on individual computer
users.
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